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Abstract 
Fluctuations in employment are one of the central issues in the labor market literature and have been 
investigated in a number of empirical and theoretical studies. This study presents a dynamic 
framework that can analyze the economy in which long-term and short-term contracts coexist. The 
particular differences between long-term and short-term contracts are stickiness of employment 
adjustments and explicit employment duration. The simulation results show that the large short-term 
employment ratio and the high quit rate lead to the high variations in employment. Moreover, they 
indicate that the large adjustment cost and the long employment duration bring about decreased 
employment fluctuations. 
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1. Introduction 
Labor market institutions are reformed frequently, which affects employment dynamics. Short-term 
contracts such as fixed-term contracts (FTC) and temporary agency work are part of labor market 
institutions and they are adopted in many countries.1 Portugal and Varejão (2009) point out that FTC 
are used for saving costs, screening for permanent positions, and temporary replacement. Givord and 
Wilner (2015) focus on the differences in short-term contracts in the context of the career prospects; 
using French data, they show that FTC are used as stepping stones to permanent positions. Nunziata 
and Staffolani (2007), using data from some European countries, also find the same role for FTC. 
Moreover, Faccini (2013) shows that the transitions of temporary workers to permanent positions are 
frequent in most European countries. 
   Some studies investigate the relationship between employment protection legislation (EPL) and 
temporary jobs. OECD (2017) points out that the strict employment protection for regular workers 
promotes using temporary contracts in OECD countries. Centeno and Novo (2012) analyze the effects 
of employment protection of open-ended contracts in the Portuguese labor market and indicate that 
stringent protection increases dependence on FTC. Hijzen et al. (2017) investigate the effects of 
employment protection on the composition of the labor force and turnover in Italy and show that 
temporary contracts are increased when firms face more stringent employment protection for 
permanent contracts. Moreover, Banker et al. (2013) point out that the strictness of EPL is a reliable 
proxy variable for labor adjustment costs. The results, based on the analysis of data from some OECD 
countries, show that the stricter EPL is related to higher stickiness. 
   The relationship between EPL and fluctuations in employment has also been studied. Gnocchi et 
al. (2015) examine the labor market reforms from the 1970s to the 2000s in some OECD countries 
and point out that the reforms relaxing EPL increase employment volatility. Faccini and Bondibene 
(2012) study the labor market institutions and cyclical behavior of the unemployment rate in OECD 
countries. Their findings indicate that the EPL for permanent workers reduces the volatility of 
unemployment rates. In addition, the employment fluctuations are studied from different perspectives. 
OECD (2017) indicates that the response of unemployment rates to aggregate demand shock is 
amplified when there is a high incidence of temporary work. de Serres and Murtin (2013) show that 
increases in the share of temporary workers brings high variations in unemployment. 
   In a theoretical analysis of an economy in which long-term and short-term contracts coexist, the 
difference between the contracts are assumed when focusing on factors such as stickiness of 
                                                        
1Cahuc et al. (2016) explain the regulations about the temporary contracts in some OECD countries. 
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employment adjustments, employment duration, and types of jobs and skills. Berton and Garibaldi 
(2012) assume that decreasing permanent employment depends on worker turnover, whereas the firm 
can fire the temporary employment at will. Blanchard and Landier (2002) suppose that firms hire 
workers in entry-level jobs, who are then retained in a regular job if they are not laid off. In Cahuc et 
al. (2016), Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), and Caggese and Cuñat (2008), the permanent contracts 
do not have predetermined duration, firms pay a firing cost if they fire those in permanent employment, 
temporary contracts stipulate a fixed duration, and the firms do not incur firing costs at the end of the 
contracts. Smith (2007) supposes that the difference between permanent and temporary jobs is that the 
duration of permanent contract is infinite, whereas that of temporary contract is finite. Yang (2017) 
assumes that firms pay a fixed firing cost when they fire non-temporary workers and supposes a 
difference in labor productivity. 
   This paper also assumes the difference between long-term and short-term contracts focusing on 
stickiness of employment adjustments and employment duration, and analyzes the employment 
fluctuations. In the baseline model, it is assumed that the firm makes an agreement for a long-term or 
a short-term contract with labor: The duration of long-term contracts is two periods and the duration 
of short-term contracts is one period. The assumption about the long-term and short-term contracts is 
also discussed in Macho-Stadler et al. (2014). Moreover, Matsue (2018) focuses on the fixed 
employment duration and produces two types of dynamic labor demand models: One with FTC and 
the other with indefinite term contracts (ITC). It shows that an expected productivity shock does not 
cause the oscillatory behavior of employment in the ITC model, while it does in the FTC model. This 
paper shows that the same property in the FTC model is also observed in the model when long-term 
and short-term employment coexist. 
   In the simulation analysis, we first investigate the relationship between short-term employment 
ratio and fluctuations in labor demand. It shows that high variations in long-term and short-term 
employment lead to high variations in total employment when the short-term employment ratio is 
large, which is consistent with OECD (2017) and de Serres and Murtin (2013). Second, the effects of 
the adjustment cost for long-term employment on fluctuations in labor demand are analyzed. It 
indicates that the fluctuations in long-term new hiring, long-term employment, short-term employment 
and total employment with no adjustment cost case is more volatile than that with an adjustment cost 
case, which is consistent with Faccini and Bondibene (2012). The adjustment cost plays a role in 
smoothing the employment fluctuations. Moreover, the fluctuations in short-term employment is more 
volatile than that of long-term employment when the firm incurs the adjustment cost, which is 
supported by Caggese and Cuñat (2008) and Yang (2017). Third, the higher volatility of long-term 
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new hiring, long-term employment, short-term employment and total employment are obtained when 
the voluntary quit rate is high. Finally, we examine the relationship between employment duration and 
fluctuations in labor demand. The assumption of explicit employment duration enables us to analyze 
the effects of extending employment duration on employment dynamics. It corresponds to, for 
example, retirement extension. Then, the fluctuations in long-term new hiring, long-term employment, 
short-term employment, and total employment are decreased when the employment duration is 
extended. 
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a simple model and discusses its 
properties. Section 3 extends the model and investigates, using simulation analysis, the effects of 
change in employment ratio, adjustment cost, voluntary quit rate, and employment duration on 
fluctuations in labor demand. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Simple model 
Consider a dynamic model that can analyze the economy in which long-term and short-term contracts 
coexist. A firm plans its production during the finite time period 𝑇. The inputs to production are long-
term employment 𝐿#$  and short-term employment 𝐿#%. The objective function of the firm takes the 
following form: 
 max
)*+ ,)*-
𝑉 = ∑ 𝛽#2#34 5𝐹7𝐿#$ , 𝐿#%; 𝐴#: − 𝑤$𝐿#$ −𝑤%𝐿#%=, 
where 0 < 𝛽 < 1 is a discount factor, 𝐴# > 0 is productivity parameter, 𝑤$ > 0 is the wage of a 
long-term contract, and 𝑤% > 0 is the wage of a short-term contract. It is assumed that the firm enters 
into a long-term contract or a short-term contract with labor: The term of long-term contracts is two 
periods and the term of short-term contracts is one period. Then, the long-term employment at period 
𝑡 is sum of the long-term new hiring at period 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1, that is 𝐿#$ = ℎ#$ + ℎ#EF$ . The short-term 
employment at period 𝑡 is the short-term new hiring at period 𝑡, that is 𝐿#% = ℎ#%. Also, ℎ4$ , ℎEF$ , 
ℎ2GF$  and ℎ2$  are given, then 𝐿4$  and 𝐿2GF$  are given. The firm decides the number of newly hired 
workers 7ℎF$ , ℎH$ ,⋯ , ℎ2EF$ : and (ℎ4% , ℎF% ,⋯ , ℎ2% ) to maximize 𝑉. The same assumption of contract 
duration is discussed in Macho-Stadler et al. (2014). First-order conditions for long-term employment 
is as follows: 
 ∑ 𝛽L#GFL3# 𝐹M+7𝐿L$ , 𝐿L%; 𝐴L: = ∑ 𝛽L#GFL3# 𝑤$ , 𝑡 = 1,2,⋯ , 𝑇 − 1.   (1) 
First-order conditions for short-term employment is as follows: 
 𝐹M-7𝐿#$ , 𝐿#%; 𝐴#: = 𝑤% , 𝑡 = 0,1, ⋯ , 𝑇.    (2) 
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The left-hand sides of (1) and (2) express the marginal product of labor, and the right-hand sides of 
(1) and (2) express the marginal cost of labor. Short-term employment is chosen by a firm to maximize 
its current profit because there is no intertemporal element. 
   Suppose that the production function is a multiplicative form which satisfies 𝐹M+ > 0, 𝐹M+M+ < 0, 
𝐹M+M- > 0 , 𝐹M- > 0 , 𝐹M-M- < 0 , 𝐹M-M+ > 0 , 𝐹P > 0 , 𝐹M+P > 0  and 𝐹M-P > 0.  Then, (2) is 
transformed as follows: 
 𝐿#% = 𝐺7𝐿#$ ; 	𝐴#:, 𝑡 = 0,1,⋯ , 𝑇.     (3) 
Substituting (3) into (1), we have the following. 
 ∑ 𝛽L#GFL3# 𝐹M+7𝐿L$ ; 𝐴L: = ∑ 𝛽L#GFL3# 𝑤$ , 𝑡 = 1,2,⋯ , 𝑇 − 1.   (4) 
From (3), (4) and 𝑑𝐿#$ = 𝑑ℎ#$ + 𝑑ℎ#EF$ , we obtain the comparative dynamics results.  
 
 
Fig. 1 The model with 𝑇 = 4 
 
   Let us specify the planning period equals 5, that is, 𝑇 = 4. The model structure is illustrated in 
Figure 1. In the periods at 0 and 5, the long-term new hiring is given: ℎVEF$ , ℎV4$ , ℎVW$ , ℎVX$ . In the 
period at 0, the long-term employment 𝐿4$  is a sum of the long-term new hiring ℎV4$  and ℎVEF$ , who 
are hired at periods 0 and −1, respectively. The short-term employment at period 0 is a short-term 
new hiring at period 0, that is 𝐿4% = ℎ4%. Then, the total employment at period 0 is the sum of the 
long-term employment 𝐿4$  and short-term employment 𝐿4% . Similarly, in the period at 1, the long-
term employment 𝐿F$  equals to sum of ℎF$  and ℎV4$ . The short-term employment at period 1 is 𝐿F% =
ℎF%. Then, the total employment at period 1 equals the sum of 𝐿F$  and 𝐿F% . The long-term, short-term 
and total employment in the other period are the same structure. 
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                   Table 1. The effects of the change in 𝐴L on ℎY$ 
 ℎF$  ℎH$  ℎZ$  
𝐴F + − + 
𝐴H + + − 
𝐴Z − + + 
𝐴W + − + 
 
             Table 2. The effects of the change in 𝐴L on 𝐿Y$  
 𝐿F$  𝐿H$  𝐿Z$  𝐿W$  
𝐴F + + − + 
𝐴H + + + − 
𝐴Z − + + + 
𝐴W + − + + 
 
             Table 3. The effects of the change in 𝐴L on 𝐿Y% 
 𝐿F%  𝐿H%  𝐿Z%  𝐿W%  
𝐴F + + − + 
𝐴H + + + − 
𝐴Z − + + + 
𝐴W + − + + 
 
             Table 4. The effects of the change in 𝐴L on 𝐿Y$ + 𝐿Y% 
 𝐿F$ + 𝐿F%  𝐿H$ + 𝐿H%  𝐿Z$ + 𝐿Z%  𝐿W$ + 𝐿W%  
𝐴F + + − + 
𝐴H + + + − 
𝐴Z − + + + 
𝐴W + − + + 
 
   Suppose that an expected temporary positive productivity shock takes place; then the comparative 
dynamic results are as summarized in Tables 1–4. The sign in the tables express the effects of the 
change in 𝐴L  on ℎY$ , 𝐿Y$ , 𝐿Y% , 𝐿Y$ + 𝐿Y%, that is 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑑ℎY$ 𝑑𝐴L⁄ ), 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑑𝐿Y$ 𝑑𝐴L⁄ ), 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑑𝐿Y% 𝑑𝐴L⁄ ), 
and 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑑(𝐿Y$ + 𝐿Y%) 𝑑𝐴L⁄ ). In the planning periods, the firm both increases and decreases each 
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employment in spite of the positive productivity shock that takes place. If the positive productivity 
shock takes place at period 1, the firm increases ℎF$  to increase 𝐿F$ . Then, if the firm does not 
decrease ℎH$ , the firm employs too much long-term employment at period 2, because 𝐿H$ = ℎH$ + ℎF$ . 
Similarly, the firm increases ℎZ$  to avoid too little long-term employment at period 3. The short-term 
employment is also adjusted together with the change in long-term employment. These decisions lead 
to the oscillatory behavior of employment. The long-term and short-term employment face the same 
change. Matsue (2018) also indicates the oscillatory behavior of labor demand using a dynamic labor 
demand model. The input is only labor, and then the firm makes an agreement for a fixed-term contract 
with labor in the model. The same mechanism of labor adjustment is discussed in the paper. The results 
in this paper indicate that the behavior is also observed in the model with long-term and short-term 
employment. 
   In the dynamic labor demand literature, adjustment cost models are widely used.2 As pointed out 
by Matsue (2018), they do not show the oscillatory behavior. If the positive shock takes place at a 
period, the firm increases new hiring in order to adjust total employment at the period. Then, the firm 
does not decrease the employment during planning periods. 
 
 
3. Numerical experiments 
To consider the effects of change in adjustment cost, voluntary quit rate, and employment duration on 
employment dynamics, we extend the model in section 2. Moreover, the relationship between short-
term employment ratio and employment dynamics is analyzed using the model. 
 
3.1. Baseline model 
It is assumed that the firm incurs an adjustment cost and the long-term employment quits at a constant 
rate at the end of the period in which he/she is hired. The adjustment cost includes, for example, 
advertising job positions, interviewing and training. The objective function of the firm takes the 
following form: 
 max
)*+ ,)*-
𝑉 = ∑ 𝛽#2#34 a𝐹7𝐿#$ , 𝐿#%; 𝐴#: − 𝑤$𝐿#$ −𝑤%𝐿#% − FH 𝜏7ℎ#$:
Hc, 
where 𝜏 > 0 is the adjustment cost of long-term new hiring. This type of adjustment cost function is 
                                                        
2Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994) and Saint-Paul (1996) discuss dynamic labor demand models with adjustment costs. 
Cabo and Martín-Román (2019) explain the dynamic labor demand literature in detail. Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) 
expound the property of the adjustment cost model.  
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also discussed in Cabo and Martín-Román (2019), Campbell and Orszag (1998), and Galí and van 
Rens (2010).3 The long-term employment at period 𝑡 is the sum of the long-term new hiring at period 
𝑡 and the long-term new hire at 𝑡 − 1 who does not quit, that is 𝐿#$ = ℎ#$ + (1 − 𝛿)ℎ#EF$ . The short-
term employment at period 𝑡 is short-term new hiring at period 𝑡, that is 𝐿#% = ℎ#%. Also, ℎ4$ , ℎEF$ , 
ℎ2GF$  and ℎ2$  are given, then 𝐿4$ 	and 𝐿2GF$  are given. The firm decides the number of newly hired 
workers 7ℎF$ , ℎH$ ,⋯ , ℎ2EF$ : and (ℎ4% , ℎF% ,⋯ , ℎ2% ) to maximize 𝑉. First-order conditions for long-term 
employment are as follows: 
 ∑ 𝛽L#GFL3# 𝐹M+7𝐿L$ , 𝐿L%; 𝐴L: = 𝛽#(𝑤$ + 𝜏ℎ#$) + 𝛽#GF(1 − 𝛿)𝑤$ , 𝑡 = 1,2, ⋯ , 𝑇 − 1. (5) 
First-order conditions for short-term employment are as follows: 
 𝐹M-7𝐿#$ , 𝐿#%; 𝐴#: = 𝑤% , 𝑡 = 0,1, ⋯ , 𝑇.    (6) 
Suppose that the production function is 𝐹7𝐿#$ , 𝐿#%; 𝐴#: = 𝐴#7𝐿#$ :e(𝐿#%)f, 𝛼 > 0, 𝛾 > 0 and 0 < 𝛼 +
𝛾 < 1. Then, (5) is as follows. 
 ∑ 𝛽L𝛼(1 − 𝛿)LE#𝐴L5ℎL$ + (1 − 𝛿)ℎLEF$ =eEF(𝐿L%)f#GFL3#  
  = 𝛽#(𝑤$ + 𝜏ℎ#$) + 𝛽#GF(1 − 𝛿)𝑤$ , 𝑡 = 1,2,⋯ , 𝑇 − 1,  (7) 
where 𝐿#$ = ℎ#$ + (1 − 𝛿)ℎ#EF$ . Similarly, (6) is transformed as follows. 
 𝛾𝐴#5ℎ#$ + (1 − 𝛿)ℎ#EF$ =e(𝐿#%)fEF = 𝑤% , 𝑡 = 0,1,⋯ , 𝑇.   (8) 
Then, (8) is expressed as follows: 
 𝐿#% = ifP*j- k
l
lmn 5ℎ#$ + (1 − 𝛿)ℎ#EF$ =
o
lmn, 𝑡 = 0,1, ⋯ , 𝑇.   (9) 
Substitute (9) into (7) to eliminate 𝐿#%. 
 ∑ 𝛽L𝛼(1 − 𝛿)LE# i fj-k
n
lmn 𝐴L
l
lmn5ℎL$ + (1 − 𝛿)ℎLEF$ =
mlpopn
lmn#GFL3#  
  = 𝛽#(𝑤$ + 𝜏ℎ#$) + 𝛽#GF(1 − 𝛿)𝑤$ , 𝑡 = 1,2,⋯ , 𝑇 − 1.  (10) 
   Suppose that the firm plans for production from period 0 to 10 (𝑇 = 10). In the beginning of 
the planning period, it is assumed that the economy is at a steady state. Then, the long-term 
employment at period 0  is 𝐿V4$ = ℎV4$ + (1 − 𝛿)ℎVEF$ = 100 . The terminal condition is long-term 
employment 𝐿VFF$ = ℎVFF$ + (1 − 𝛿)ℎVF4$ = 100.4 The baseline parameters are set as in Table 5. The 
adjustment cost parameter 𝜏 and the quit rate 𝛿 are the same values used in Cabo and Martín-Román 
(2019).5 The parameters 𝛼 and 𝛾 are set in order to generate a steady state short-term employment 
                                                        
3Some studies using quadratic adjustment costs are listed in Appendix A. 
4The derivation of steady state value ℎVEF$ = ℎV4$ = ℎVF4$ = ℎVFF$ = ℎ$ and 𝐿%, and the derivation of initial productivity 
level are shown in Appendix B. 
5See Cabo and Martín-Román (2019), p.122, footnote 26. Blatter et al. (2012) show a histogram of average hiring 
costs to fill a vacancy using Swiss administrative firm-level survey data (p.26). Booth and Francesconi (2000) 
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ratio (𝐿% (𝐿$ + 𝐿%)⁄ ) equals 0.11  (11%). The steady state short-term employment ratio roughly 
matches the ratio of OECD weighted average discussed in OECD (2017).6 OECD (2015) indicates 
that the temporary workers' hourly wages are around 70% of the median hourly wages of permanent 
workers in some OECD countries.7 Then, we set 𝑤$ = 1.0 and 𝑤% = 0.7. Additionally, the discount 
factor 𝛽 = 0.96 is assumed. 
 
    Table 5. Baseline parameters 
Parameter Value 
𝛼 Parameters in production function 0.686083 
𝛾 Parameters in production function 0.014927 
𝛽 Discount factor 0.96 
𝑤$ Wage of long-term employment 1.0 
𝑤% Wage of short-term employment 0.7 
𝛿 Voluntary quit rate 0.15 
𝜏 Adjustment cost 0.1 
 
   The initial productivity level is 23.6953, which is chosen by having 𝐿V4$ = 100. Suppose that the 
expected temporary productivity shock takes place at period 1: The productivity increases one percent 
at period 1 and then returns at period 2. The baseline simulation results are represented in Figure 2, 
which shows the deviation of long-term new hiring, long-term employment, short-term employment, 
and total employment when the positive shock takes place from their steady state values, respectively. 
It is observed that the deviations are the largest at the shock period, and all variables then gradually 
return to each steady state value. In the steady state, the long-term new hiring and short-term 
employment are hired as much as the labor who quits. The employment fluctuations and steady state 
values in the baseline simulations are shown in Table 6. The fluctuations in employment are measured 
by using the coefficient of variation (CV). The short-term employment is more volatile than long-term 
employment, which matches empirical evidence. Caggese and Cuñat (2008) indicate that the 
                                                        
indicate that 8.88% of men and 9.47% of women in full-time employment voluntarily quit their jobs each year in 
Britain (p.178, 180). Fairise and Fève (2006) suppose that the quit rate equals to 0.015, which roughly matches the 
average destruction rate in the US manufacturing sector from 1972 to 1993 (p.101). Silva and Toledo (2009) analyze 
the US labor market and assume an exogenous separation probability is 0.065 in the simulation (p.85). Goux et al. 
(2001) show that the voluntary quit rate is about 4% of the work force each year, which use French data (p.547). 
6See OECD (2017), p.205. Also, the shares of temporary employment in total employment in European countries are 
listed in Eichhorst et al. (2017), page 4 of 17, and the share in the US is described in Yang (2017), p.5. The shares of 
temporary workers by industry and country in some European countries are shown in Damiani et al. (2016), p.596. 
7See OECD (2015), p.153. 
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fluctuations in fixed-term employment are more volatile than that of permanent employment using 
Italian data. Yang (2017) shows that the high volatility of temporary employment is observed in the 
US labor market. 
 
     
              (a) Long-term new hiring        (b) Long-term employment 
     
      (c) Short-term employment        (d) Total employment 
Fig. 2 Employment fluctuations in baseline simulations 
 
           Table 6. Steady state values and CV in baseline simulation 
 ℎ#$  𝐿#$  𝐿#% = ℎ#% 𝐿#$ + 𝐿#% 
Steady state 54.0541 100 12.3596 112.3596 
CV 0.00210697 0.00128038 0.00393852 0.00152591 
 
   If it is assumed that all of the long-term employment quit at the end of the first period in which 
they are hired (𝛿 = 1), no adjustment cost (𝜏 = 0), no wage differences (𝑤$ = 𝑤%), and parameters in 
production function are the same (𝛼 = 𝛾), then the difference between long-term and short-term 
employment does not exist and the steady state value of long-term employment equals that of short-
term employment. In addition, the firm adjusts the employment only in the shock period, and the 
fluctuations in long-term employment equal that of short-term employment. 
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3.2. Short-term employment ratio and fluctuations in labor demand 
One of the main interests of this paper is to analyze the effect of increasing short-term employment 
ratio on employment dynamics. Consider the situation produced when a firm has a large short-term 
employment ratio. It is assumed that the steady state short-term employment ratio (𝐿% (𝐿$ + 𝐿%)⁄ ) is 
0.2 (20%) or 0.3 (30%). The same parameters are used in the baseline simulation except for the 
parameters in production function 𝛼  and 𝛾 : If 𝛼 = 0.6704929  and 𝛾 = 0.0295071 , then the 
steady state short-term employment ratio is 0.2, and if 𝛼 = 0.650895 and 𝛾 = 0.049105, then the 
steady state short-term employment ratio is 0.3 . It is supposed that the expected temporary 
productivity shock takes place at period 1, which is a one percent increase in productivity. 
 
           Table 7. Steady state values and CV with short-term employment ratio is 0.2 (20 %) 
 ℎ#$  𝐿#$  𝐿#% = ℎ#% 𝐿#$ + 𝐿#% 
Steady state 54.0541 100 25 125 
CV 0.00213306 0.00129531 0.00398957 0.00176652 
 
   The employment fluctuations and steady state values with employment ratio equaling 0.2 are 
shown in Table 7. The initial productivity level is 24.5967, which is chosen by having 𝐿V4$ = 100.8 
The fluctuations in long-term new hiring, long-term employment, short-term employment, and total 
employment are more volatile than that of baseline simulations. Moreover, the high variations in long-
term and short-term employment lead to the high variations in total employment. 
 
           Table 8. Steady state values and CV with short-term employment ratio is 0.3 (30 %) 
 ℎ#$  𝐿#$  𝐿#% = ℎ#% 𝐿#$ + 𝐿#% 
Steady state 54.0541 100 42.8571 142.8571 
CV 0.00217063 0.00131706 0.00406251 0.00206182 
 
   The employment fluctuations and steady state values with short-term employment ratio equaling 
0.3 are shown in Table 8. The initial productivity level is 25.3551, which is chosen by having 𝐿V4$ =
100. The fluctuations in all variables are more volatile than when short-term employment ratio equals 
0.2. The firm copes with the shock by making a large adjustment in employment when the short-term 
                                                        
8The derivation of steady state value ℎ$ and 𝐿%, and the derivation of initial productivity level are the same as the 
baseline model, which is shown in Appendix B. 
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employment ratio is large. In other words, the employment fluctuations are easily influenced by the 
shock when the short-term employment ratio is large. OECD (2017) indicates that the response of the 
unemployment rate to aggregate demand shock is amplified when temporary work is at high incidence. 
de Serres and Murtin (2013) show that the increasing share of temporary workers brings high 
variations of unemployment. The simulation results could be supported by these findings. 
 
3.3. Adjustment cost and fluctuations in labor demand 
In this section, we present an analysis of the effects of adjustment cost on employment dynamics. The 
same parameters are used in the baseline simulation except for the adjustment cost 𝜏 = 0. The initial 
productivity level is 6.0828, which is chosen by having 𝐿V4$ = 100.9 It is assumed that the expected 
temporary productivity shock takes place at period 1, which is a one percent increase in productivity. 
 
     
              (a) Long-term new hiring        (b) Long-term employment 
     
      (c) Short-term employment        (d) Total employment 
Fig. 3 Employment fluctuations without adjustment cost 
 
           Table 9. Steady state values and CV without adjustment cost 
 ℎ#$  𝐿#$  𝐿#% = ℎ#% 𝐿#$ + 𝐿#% 
Steady state 54.0541 100 3.10812 103.108 
CV 0.0371019 0.0105709 0.01058 0.0105709 
 
                                                        
9The derivation of steady state value ℎ$ and 𝐿%, and the derivation of initial productivity level are the same as the 
baseline model (Appendix B). 
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   The simulation results are represented in Figure 3, which shows the deviation of long-term new 
hiring, long-term employment, short-term employment, and total employment when the positive shock 
takes place from their steady state values. It shows that all variables fluctuate in the planning periods. 
The employment fluctuations and steady state values with no adjustment cost case are shown in Table 
9. The steady state short-term employment ratio (𝐿% (𝐿$ + 𝐿%)⁄ ) is 0.0301 (3.01%), which is lower 
than the baseline case. The fluctuations in long-term and short-term employment are comparable to 
the level in the no adjustment cost case. Both the fluctuations in long-term and short-term employment 
with no adjustment cost case are more volatile than that of the baseline simulations. The adjustment 
cost plays a role in smoothing the employment fluctuations, which is the same result found in the 
literature on dynamic labor demand (e.g., Nickell 1986). Moreover, the simulation results could be 
supported by Faccini and Bondibene (2012), who indicate that the EPL for permanent workers reduces 
the volatility of unemployment rates. 
 
3.4. Quit rate and fluctuations in labor demand 
Let us analyze the relationship between voluntary quit rate and employment fluctuations. The same 
parameters are used in the baseline simulations except for the quit rate 𝛿 = 0.3 . The initial 
productivity level is 26.8714, which is chosen by having 𝐿V4$ = 100.10 The productivity is at a higher 
level than that of the baseline case. It is supposed that the expected temporary productivity shock takes 
place at period 1, which is a one percent increase in productivity. 
   The simulation results are described in Figure 4, which shows the deviation of long-term new 
hiring, long-term employment, short-term employment, and total employment when the positive shock 
takes place from their steady state values. The same behavior in the baseline simulations are observed. 
The employment fluctuations and steady state values with high quit rate are shown in Table 10. The 
steady state short-term employment ratio (𝐿% (𝐿$ + 𝐿%)⁄ ) is 0.123 (12.3%), which is higher than that 
of the baseline case. The fluctuations in long-term new hiring, long-term employment, short-term 
employment, and total employment are more volatile than that of the baseline simulations. In this 
situation, many long-term employees quit at the end of the first period in which they are hired. Then, 
the firm greatly increases the long-term new hiring to increase the long-term employment greatly in 
the period in which the shock takes place, and it brings a high variation of long-term new hiring and 
long-term employment. The fluctuations in short-term employment also increase with the change in 
long-term employment. Therefore, the higher volatility of total employment is obtained when the quit 
                                                        
10The derivation of steady state value ℎ$ and 𝐿%, and the derivation of initial productivity level are same as the 
baseline model (Appendix B). 
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rate is high. 
 
     
              (a) Long-term new hiring        (b) Long-term employment 
     
      (c) Short-term employment        (d) Total employment 
Fig. 4 Employment fluctuations with quit rate is 0.3 
  
           Table 10. Steady state values and CV with quit rate is 0.3 
 ℎ#$  𝐿#$  𝐿#% = ℎ#% 𝐿#$ + 𝐿#% 
Steady state 58.8235 100 14.043 114.043 
CV 0.00220049 0.0013644 0.00403859 0.00165749 
 
3.5. Employment duration and fluctuations in labor demand 
In this section, we discuss the relationship between employment duration and employment dynamics. 
The retirement extension, for example, corresponds to the analysis in this section. In addition to the 
analysis in common with the previous studies about dynamic labor demand, the assumption of the 
explicit employment duration enables us to analyze the effects of extending employment duration on 
employment dynamics. 
   The objective function of a firm is the same as in the baseline model. The long-term employment 
at period 𝑡 is the sum of the long-term new hiring at period 𝑡, 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 − 2. Then, the constant 
rate 𝛿  of new hiring quits a job in the end of each period, that is, 𝐿#$ = ℎ#$ + (1 − 𝛿)ℎ#EF$ +
(1 − 𝛿)Hℎ#EH$ . The short-term employment at period 𝑡 is short-term new hiring at period 𝑡, that is 
𝐿#% = ℎ#%. Also, ℎ4$ , ℎEF$ , ℎEH$ , ℎ2GF$ , ℎ2$  and ℎ2EF$  are given, then 𝐿4$  and 𝐿2GF$  are given. The 
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firm decides the number of newly hired workers 7ℎF$ , ℎH$ , ⋯ , ℎ2EH$ : and (ℎ4% , ℎF% ,⋯ , ℎ2% ) to maximize 
𝑉. First-order conditions for long-term employment are as follows: 
 ∑ 𝛽L#GHL3# 𝐹M+7𝐿L$ , 𝐿L%; 𝐴L: = 𝛽#(𝑤$ + 𝜏ℎ#$) + 𝛽#GF(1 − 𝛿)𝑤$ + 𝛽#GH(1 − 𝛿)H𝑤$ , 
      	𝑡 = 1,2, ⋯ , 𝑇 − 2. (11) 
First-order conditions for short-term employment are as follows: 
 𝐹M-7𝐿#$ , 𝐿#%; 𝐴#: = 𝑤% , 𝑡 = 0,1, ⋯ , 𝑇.    (12) 
It is assumed that the production function is the same as previous section 𝐹7𝐿#$ , 𝐿#%; 𝐴#: =
𝐴#7𝐿#$ :e(𝐿#%)f, then (11) is as follows. 
 ∑ 𝛽L𝛼(1 − 𝛿)LE#𝐴L5ℎL$ + (1 − 𝛿)ℎLEF$ + (1 − 𝛿)HℎLEH$ =eEF(𝐿L%)f#GHL3#  
  = 𝛽#(𝑤$ + 𝜏ℎ#$) + 𝛽#GF(1 − 𝛿)𝑤$ + 𝛽#GH(1 − 𝛿)H𝑤$ , 
     𝑡 = 1,2,⋯ , 𝑇 − 2,  (13) 
where 𝐿#$ = ℎ#$ + (1 − 𝛿)ℎ#EF$ + (1 − 𝛿)Hℎ#EH$ . Similarly, (12) is transformed as follows. 
 𝛾𝐴#5ℎ#$ + (1 − 𝛿)ℎ#EF$ + (1 − 𝛿)Hℎ#EF$ =e(𝐿#%)fEF = 𝑤% , 𝑡 = 0,1,⋯ , 𝑇. (14) 
Then, (14) is expressed as follows: 
 𝐿#% = ifP*j- k
l
lmn 5ℎ#$ + (1 − 𝛿)ℎ#EF$ + (1 − 𝛿)Hℎ#EH$ =
o
lmn, 𝑡 = 0,1,⋯ , 𝑇. (15) 
Substituting (15) into (13) to eliminate 𝐿#%, we obtain: 
 ∑ 𝛽L𝛼(1 − 𝛿)LE# i fj-k
n
lmn 𝐴L
l
lmn5ℎL$ + (1 − 𝛿)ℎLEF$ + (1 − 𝛿)HℎLEH$ =
mlpopn
lmn#GHL3#  
  = 𝛽#(𝑤$ + 𝜏ℎ#$) + 𝛽#GF(1 − 𝛿)𝑤$ + 𝛽#GH(1 − 𝛿)H𝑤$ , 
      𝑡 = 1,2,⋯ , 𝑇 − 2. (16) 
As in the previous sections, if 𝛿 = 1, 𝜏 = 0, 𝑤$ = 𝑤% and 𝛼 = 𝛾 are assumed, then the difference 
between long-term and short-term employment does not exist. 
   The same parameters are used in the baseline simulation, which is listed in Table 5. In the 
beginning of the planning period, the economy is at a steady state. It is assumed that the long-term 
employment at period 0 is 𝐿V4$ = ℎV4$ + (1 − 𝛿)ℎVEF$ + (1 − 𝛿)HℎVEH$ = 100. The terminal condition is 
long-term employment 𝐿VFF$ = ℎVFF$ + (1 − 𝛿)ℎVF4$ + (1 − 𝛿)HℎVu$ = 100. The initial productivity level 
is 15.3922, which is chosen by having 𝐿V4$ = 100.11 Similarly to the previous sections, it is supposed 
that the expected temporary productivity shock takes place at period 1, which is a one percent increase 
in productivity. 
 
                                                        
11The derivation of steady state value ℎVEH$ = ℎVEF$ = ℎV4$ = ℎVu$ = ℎVF4$ = ℎVFF$ = ℎ$ and 𝐿%, and the derivation of initial 
productivity level are shown in Appendix C. 
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              (a) Long-term new hiring        (b) Long-term employment 
     
      (c) Short-term employment        (d) Total employment 
Fig. 5 Employment fluctuations with long-term employment duration lasts three periods 
 
          Table 11. Steady state values and CV with long-term employment duration is three periods 
 ℎ#$  𝐿#$  𝐿#% = ℎ#% 𝐿#$ + 𝐿#% 
Steady state 38.8727 100 7.97629 107.97629 
CV 0.00209041 0.000899301 0.00366559 0.00105506 
 
   The simulation results are described in Figure 5, which shows the deviation of long-term new 
hiring, long-term employment, short-term employment, and total employment when a positive shock 
takes place from their steady state values. In the planning periods, as is the case with the long-term 
employment works for two periods, the firm both increases and decreases employment in spite of the 
positive productivity shock. Moreover, it is observed that the shock is absorbed in longer periods when 
the employment duration is longer. The employment fluctuations and steady state values with longer 
contract durations are shown in Table 11. The steady state short-term employment ratio (𝐿% (𝐿$ + 𝐿%)⁄ ) 
is 0.0739 (7.39%), which is lower than the baseline case. The variations in long-term new hiring, 
long-term employment, short-term employment and total employment are smaller than that of baseline 
simulations. The firm copes with the shock by making a small adjustment in long-term new hiring. 
Then, the lower fluctuations in long-term employment are observed. In addition, the short-term 
employment is adjusted together with the change in long-term employment. Therefore, a lower 
volatility of total employment is obtained. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
The relationship between the composition of the labor force and employment dynamics has been 
investigated in a number of studies. This paper presents a framework that can analyze an economy in 
which long-term and short-term contracts coexist, and explains some facts about employment 
dynamics. We investigate the effects of change in short-term employment ratio, adjustment cost, 
voluntary quit rate, and employment duration on fluctuations in labor demand by simulation analysis. 
The model shows that the large short-term employment ratio and the high quit rate lead to the high 
variations in employment. Moreover, it indicates that the large adjustment cost and long employment 
duration decrease fluctuations in employment. 
   The model in this study is restricted to a simple case in which the term of long-term contracts is 
only two or three periods. It should be analyzed further using a more general case. In this paper, we 
focus on the labor demand side. The model can be extended to consider the supply side of labor. 
Additional study of these issues should be undertaken in future research. 
 
 
Appendix A. Quadratic adjustment costs 
Table A1. Quadratic labor adjustment costs 
Literatures Variables 
Akinci and Chahrour (2018) Growth rate of working hours. 
Belo et al. (2014) Output, firing, hiring and employment level. 
Bloom (2009) Firing, hiring and employment level. 
Cabo and Martín-Román (2019) Firing, hiring and wage. 
Campbell and Orszag (1998) Firing and hiring. 
Cooper and Willis (2009) Employment growth and employment level. 
Fairise and Fève (2006) Hiring, turnover and employment level. 
Galí and van Rens (2010) Firing and hiring. 
Hall (2004) Employment growth, employment level and wage/product price. 
Ju et al. (2014) Difference between employment level and steady state level of 
employment. 
Lapatinas (2009) Employment growth and employment level. 
Vogel (2017) Wage and change in employment level. 
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The adjustment costs include, for example, advertising job positions, interviewing, training, disruption 
of production cost, and severance pay. They are expressed as an adjustment cost function in theoretical 
and empirical models. In the literature, a quadratic adjustment cost function is frequently assumed. 
Then, the adjustment costs depend on some variables, as shown in Table A1. Variables in the table 
demonstrate that the adjustment costs depend upon which variables are used in each study. The 
adjustment cost functions are formulated in various forms. 
   Lapatinas (2009) also discusses the other adjustment cost models: Quadratic adjustment costs and 
disruption of production costs model, quadratic adjustment costs and fixed costs model, and quadratic 
adjustment costs, fixed costs and disruption of production costs model.  
 
 
Appendix B. Steady state values in baseline model 
It is assumed that the initial productivity level of 𝐴 equals the steady state value of 𝐴 in the baseline 
simulations. Suppose that ℎ#GF$ = ℎ#$ = ℎ$ , 𝐿$ = (2 − 𝛿)ℎ$ , 𝐿#% = 𝐿%  and 𝐴#GF = 𝐴# = 𝐴 in (7), 
we can transform the equation as follows. 
 𝐴 = [FGw(FEx)](HEx)j+GzM+[FGw(FEx)]e(HEx)7M+:oml(M-)n      (A1) 
Suppose that ℎ#GF$ = ℎ#$ = ℎ$, 𝐿$ = (2 − 𝛿)ℎ$, 𝐿#% = 𝐿% and 𝐴# = 𝐴 in (9), we can transform the 
equation as follows. 
 𝐿% = ifPj-k
l
lmn (𝐿$)
o
lmn,      (A2) 
which is the steady state value of short-term employment. Substitute (A2) into (A1) to eliminate 𝐿#%. 
Then, the steady state value of 𝐴 is obtained. 
 𝐴 = { [FGw(FEx)](HEx)j+GzM+[FGw(FEx)]e(HEx)7M+:oml|
FEf
i FM+k
ef ij-f k
f
   (A3) 
   To consider the steady state value of long-term new hiring ℎ$, we assume that ℎ#GF$ = ℎ#$ = ℎ$, 
𝐿$ = (2 − 𝛿)ℎ$, 𝐿#% = 𝐿% and 𝐴#GF = 𝐴# = 𝐴 in (7). Then, the following equation is obtained. 
 𝐿$ = i[FGw(FEx)]e(HEx)P(M-)n[FGw(FEx)](HEx)j+GzM+ k
l
lmo
     (A4) 
From 	𝐿$ = (2 − 𝛿)ℎ$, (A4) is transformed as follows. 
 ℎ$ = i[FGw(FEx)]e(HEx)P(M-)n[FGw(FEx)](HEx)j+GzM+ k
l
lmo F
HEx,    (A5) 
which is the steady state value of long-term new hiring. From (A2), (A3) and (A5), we obtain the 
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steady state value of ℎ$, 𝐿% and 𝐴 in the baseline simulations. Then, we suppose that 𝐿$ = 𝐿V4$ =
𝐿VFF$ = 100. 
 
Appendix C. Steady state values in the model with longer employment duration 
It is assumed that the initial productivity level of 𝐴 equals the steady state value of 𝐴 in the model 
with longer employment duration. In the model, the long-term employment work for 3 period. Suppose 
that ℎ#GF$ = ℎ#$ = ℎ$ , 𝐿$ = (3 − 3𝛿 + 𝛿H)ℎ$ , 𝐿#% = 𝐿%  and 𝐴#GF = 𝐴# = 𝐴  in (13), we have the 
following. 
 𝐴 = [FGw(FEx)Gw}(FEx)}](ZEZxGx})j+GzM+[FGw(FEx)Gw}(FEx)}]e(ZEZxGx})7M+:oml(M-)n    (A6) 
Suppose that ℎ#GF$ = ℎ#$ = ℎ$ , 𝐿$ = (3 − 3𝛿 + 𝛿H)ℎ$ , 𝐿#% = 𝐿%  and 𝐴# = 𝐴  in (15), we can 
transform the equation as follows. 
 𝐿% = ifPj-k
l
lmn (𝐿$)
o
lmn,      (A7) 
which is the steady state value of short-term employment. Substitute (A7) into (A6) to eliminate 𝐿#%. 
Then, we have the steady state value of 𝐴. 
 𝐴 = { [FGw(FEx)Gw}(FEx)}](ZEZxGx})j+GzM+[FGw(FEx)Gw}(FEx)}]e(ZEZxGx})7M+:oml|
FEf
i FM+k
ef ij-f k
f
  (A8) 
   In order to derive steady state value of ℎ$, we assume ℎ#GF$ = ℎ#$ = ℎ$, 𝐿$ = (3 − 3𝛿 + 𝛿H)ℎ$, 
𝐿#% = 𝐿% and 𝐴#GF = 𝐴# = 𝐴 in (13). Then, we can transform the equation as follows. 
 𝐿$ = i[FGw(FEx)Gw}(FEx)}]e(ZEZxGx})P(M-)n[FGw(FEx)Gw}(FEx)}](ZEZxGx})j+GzM+ k
l
lmo
   (A9) 
From 𝐿$ = (3 − 3𝛿 + 𝛿H)ℎ$ and (A9), the steady state value of long-term new hiring is obtained. 
 ℎ$ = i[FGw(FEx)Gw}(FEx)}]e(ZEZxGx})P(M-)n[FGw(FEx)Gw}(FEx)}](ZEZxGx})j+GzM+ k
l
lmo F
ZEZxGx}   (A10) 
From (A7), (A8) and (A10), we obtain the steady state value of ℎ$, 𝐿% and 𝐴 in the simulations with 
longer employment duration. Then, we suppose that 𝐿$ = 𝐿V4$ = 𝐿VFF$ = 100. 
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